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Why Consumer Defendants Lump It 
Emily S. Taylor Poppe* 
ABSTRACT 
Contrary to popular claims about Americans’ litigiousness, one of the most 
common responses to civil legal problems is lumping it: choosing to do nothing even 
when there is legal action that might be taken. A substantial body of socio-legal 
scholarship investigates this phenomenon, but has focused almost exclusively on 
individuals’ willingness and ability to initiate legal actions as plaintiffs. Similarly, 
research on consumers’ participation in civil litigation is primarily concerned with the 
actions of consumer plaintiffs. Yet individuals also are named as defendants in civil 
actions, including many who are sued for claims arising out of consumer transactions. 
The majority of these suits are attempts to collect on consumer debts, and in most cases, 
the consumer defendant will never appear in court. By failing to appear, consumer 
defendants forego the opportunity to raise affirmative substantive or procedural defenses, 
negotiate with the plaintiff, or seek the court’s favor in discretionary rulings.  
This Article takes a novel approach by considering how incentive structures and 
structural inequalities in litigation contribute to the limited legal participation of 
consumer defendants. To illustrate the impact of these forces, this Article presents an 
empirical study of the residential foreclosure process. Using an original dataset of more 
than 900 foreclosure cases filed in New York City, this Article tracks defendant 
homeowners’ participation in civil actions to foreclose. In situations such as those, 
consumer defendants’ participation not only potentially influences case outcomes, but 
also plays an important role in monitoring and enforcing procedural and substantive 
law. Recognizing the significance of legal action by consumer defendants, this Article 
offers reforms to address their limited participation in civil litigation. In doing so, it 
opens new areas of inquiry for consumer law scholars, as well as those concerned with 
access to justice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Should is a futile word. It’s about what didn’t happen.”1 
“Typically, the homeowner who . . . faces a foreclosure suit is not 
interested in testing state or federal jurisdictional requirements . . . Their 
focus is either, ‘how do I save my home,’ or ‘if I have to give it up, I’ll 
simply leave and find somewhere else to live.’”2 
Over a five-month period in the fall and winter of 2014–2015, law firms hired by 
Transworld Systems, Inc. (Transworld) initiated more than 37,000 civil actions against 
consumers to collect on student loans held by the National Collegiate Student Loan 
Trusts.3 In support of many of these lawsuits, Transworld relied on false or misleading 
affidavits and testimony.4 As a result of these allegedly unfair and deceptive practices,5 
consumers made payments on debts, including through garnished wages and bank 
accounts, which were actually unenforceable.6 In response to action by the Consumer 
Finance Protection Bureau, Transworld agreed to a settlement of over $21 million.7 Yet 
this amount represents only a tiny fraction of the trusts’ $12 billion holdings8 and an even 
smaller share of more than $1.5 trillion in outstanding student loan debt nationally.9  
In the majority of actions to collect on consumer debts, default judgments are 
entered against consumer borrowers who fail to appear, even when there are flaws in the 
creditors’ claims.10 By failing to participate in these lawsuits, consumer defendants 
forego the opportunity to raise affirmative substantive or procedural defenses, negotiate 
with the plaintiff, or seek the court’s favor in discretionary rulings. Given the potential 
benefits afforded by participation in the litigation, why do so many consumer defendants 
choose not to appear? Prior research has established that “lumping it”—doing nothing in 
response to a legal problem even where there is legal action that might be taken—is not 
                                                          
1 MARGARET ATWOOD, THE BLIND ASSASSIN 428 (2000). 
2 In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 1:07-CV-2282, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007). 
3 Transworld Sys., Inc., CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0018, 4, 6 (Sept. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Consent Order]. 
Over a three-year period between 2014 and 2017, Transworld filed more than 38,000 suits on behalf of the 
trusts. Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Behind the Lucrative Assembly Line of Student Debt 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/business/dealbook/student-
debt-lawsuits.html.  
4 Consent Order, supra note 3, at 10. 
5 Id. at 11–12. 
6 Id. at 12.   
7 Id.; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Student Loan Companies Reach $21.6 Million Settlement over Dubious 
Debt Collection Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2017/09/18/student-loan-companies-reach-21-6-million-settlement-over-dubious-debt-collection-
lawsuits/?utm_term=.2fc97f849419. 
8 When established, the trusts held more than 874,000 student loans amounting to $12 billion in principal. 
Shahien Nasiripour, Wall Street Is Fighting a CFPB Deal over Billions in Defaulted Student Loans, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-08/wall-street-
is-fighting-a-cfpb-deal-over-billions-in-defaulted-student-loans.  
9 Consumer Credit Outstanding (Levels), FED. RESERVE BANK, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_memo_levels.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2018). 
10 See sources cited infra note 18. 
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uncommon.11 However, this research has focused almost exclusively on the behavior of 
potential plaintiffs. Similarly, scholarship on consumer litigation has primarily been 
concerned with enhancing legal action by consumer plaintiffs.12   
This Article takes a novel approach by focusing on the behavior of consumer 
defendants. More specifically, the Article considers the social, economic, legal, and 
structural forces that contribute to individual defendants’ limited participation in 
litigation arising out of consumer transactions. In doing so, this Article extends socio-
legal scholarship on individuals’ actions in response to legal problems, as well as 
research on structural inequalities in litigation and consumer law enforcement.  
To illustrate how these hindrances shape legal action by consumer defendants, I 
present an empirical study of the residential foreclosure process. Using an original dataset 
of more than 900 residential foreclosure cases initiated in New York City, the study 
documents defendant homeowners’ limited participation in the foreclosure process, the 
absence of legal representation for most homeowners, and the challenges presented by 
the heavy reliance on solo practitioners among those homeowners who obtain legal 
counsel. In contrast, I find that many of the plaintiffs are among the most powerful 
financial institutions in the world and enjoy the benefit of access to low-cost, specialized 
legal counsel. I also describe the outcomes of the cases, noting how plaintiffs’ ability to 
engage in litigation selectively influences the resolution of individual cases and the 
development of precedent.  
Recognizing that by participating in civil litigation, consumer defendants not only 
protect their interests, but also serve important monitoring and enforcement functions, I 
offer a series of proposals to address their limited legal action. While regulatory actions 
can also serve to deter and punish violations of substantive and procedural law, 
enforcement varies significantly by administration.13 In eras of limited regulatory 
enforcement, legal action by consumer defendants may become particularly significant.  
By considering the legal action of consumer defendants, this Article addresses a 
topic of doctrinal and policy import that has largely been overlooked. In doing so, this 
Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the context in which consumers are sued, 
                                                          
11 See William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
63, 81 (1974) (defining “lumping it” as a form of avoidance in which the wronged party ignores the dispute 
even though the complaint has not been satisfied); see also Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing 
Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL 
PROCESS 112, 123 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007); sources cited infra note 22.  
12 See KATHERINE PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW 518 (2016) (“Underenforcement via private lawsuit 
is perhaps the most vexing problem in consumer law.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 707–08 (2013). 
13 See Gillian B. White, Mick Mulvaney Is Pretending Everything’s Totally Normal at Work, ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/mulvaney-cfpb/546917/ (quoting 
Mick Mulvaney, President Trump’s appointee to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: 
“[A]nybody who thinks that a Trump administration CFPB would be the same as an Obama administration 
CFPB is simply naive. Elections have consequences.”); see also Gillian B. White, The CFPB’s New 
Mission, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/cfpb-trump-
mulvaney/551504/ (discussing memo by Mulvaney describing the new mission of the CFPB); 
Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., CFPB, to CFPB Staff 1 (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4357880-Mulvaney-Memo.html (“[W]e work for the people. 
And that means everyone: those who use credit cards, and those who provide those cards; those who take 
loans, and those who make them . . . .”). 
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explains how the situation of consumer defendants differs from that of consumer 
plaintiffs, and considers how these differences generate challenges to legal participation 
by consumer defendants. To illustrate these challenges, Part II presents an empirical 
study of the residential foreclosure process in New York City. Drawing on the theoretical 
and empirical insights, Part III describes several avenues for addressing consumer 
defendants’ limited legal action.  
I. CONSUMER DEFENDANTS 
As Professor Katherine Porter notes, consumers’ willingness and ability to obtain 
legal relief depends “not just on the substantive remedies, but on recognizing that those 
remedies are imbedded in a system of actors, including consumers, lawyers, and 
judges.”14 This section considers how these realities apply to the particular case of 
consumer defendants.   
A. When Consumers Get Sued  
The classic example of consumer litigation involves a consumer or class of 
consumers filing suit against a business over harms arising from a transaction between 
the business and the consumer. This situation, which I refer to as “offensive consumer 
litigation,” has generally been the focus of scholars concerned with legal action by 
consumers. It is also representative of the typical form of litigation addressed by research 
on individuals’ dispute processing behavior and structural inequalities in litigation.  
However, consumer litigation also takes another form, when consumers are sued by 
businesses, which I term “defensive consumer litigation.” In this type of litigation, 
consumers are defendants, rather than plaintiffs. Defensive consumer litigation is 
epitomized by debt collection actions, in which creditors access enforcement remedies 
through the court system.15 In these cases, lenders or third-party debt collectors initiate 
legal action to enforce loans that are either unsecured (e.g., student loans, credit card 
balances) or secured (e.g., mortgages). 
Debt collection cases are significant for a number of reasons. First, they are 
increasingly prevalent—consumer issues are among the most common types of legal 
problems experienced by individuals, and many of these issues revolve around the 
collection of debt.16 Indeed, a substantial proportion of civil litigation is now comprised 
                                                          
14 PORTER, supra note 12, at 536; Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private 
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1416, 1424 (2011) (describing how social inequalities result 
in underenforcement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act by private individuals).  
15 For a discussion of the foreclosure context, see infra Part II. Many landlord–tenant cases exhibit a similar 
structure but are less central to conceptions of consumer law.  
16 CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PUB., AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A 
SURVEY OF AMERICANS App’x B (1994), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/downloads/le
galneedstudy.authcheckdam.pdf; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT 
14 (2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Consumer-Response-Annual-
Report-2016.PDF (noting that debt-related issues are the largest sources of complaints made to the agency); 
REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ASSESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS 
FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 8 (2014), 
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of debt collection cases.17 Additionally, a growing body of research documents 
widespread and persistent problems with the claims of creditors in these cases.18 Despite 
this, most debtors fail to engage in the legal process.19 As a result, default judgments are 
entered against them, allowing creditors to access enforcement mechanisms. Finally, debt 
collection cases are important given the significant implications for individuals and 
families, and, as the Great Recession made clear, for the larger economy.20  
B. Why Consumer Defending is Different  
The situations of consumer defendants and consumer plaintiffs differ in important 
ways.21 The litigation decisions and the resulting consequences faced by consumer 
respondents are different from those of consumer claimants. Moreover, the role of 
structural inequalities inherent in consumer litigation may have different implications in 
defensive consumer litigation. Finally, the substance of their disputes and its relation to 
substantive consumer law also differ. This section considers each of these issues in turn.  
1. Consumer Defendant Dispute Processing 
Socio-legal scholars have devoted considerable attention to individuals’ responses 
to problems implicating civil legal issues.22 Drawing largely on influential work 
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_accessing_justice_in_the_contem
porary_usa._aug._2014.pdf.  
17 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD 
BETTER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY 41 (2009), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09748.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2009] (citing Federal Trade Commission 
finding that “the majority of cases on many state court dockets on any given day are debt collection cases”).  
18 Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? — Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in 
Indiana, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355, 377 (2012); Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar 
Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. 
L. 259, 268 (2011); Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection 
Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 291–94 (2011). 
19 See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 205 (1974); GAO 
2009, supra note 17, at 41 (citing Urban Justice Center finding that default judgments were entered in 80% 
of a sample of debt-collection cases filed in New York City); Fox, supra note 18, at 377 (noting that 83% 
of defendants failed to respond in a sample of Indiana debt-collection cases); Spector, supra note 18, at 
289; Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System 
Failed?, 67 DENV. L. REV. 357, 361 (1990) (noting that default judgments were entered by 74% of 
consumers in a sample of small-claims consumer cases). 
20 See infra Part II.  
21 Of course, there are also many obstacles to consumer litigation that both consumer plaintiffs and 
defendants face, including contract terms that limit rights or require arbitration.  
22 One body of research focuses on the emergence and trajectory of disputes. See, e.g., DAVID S. COWAN ET 
AL., THE APPEAL OF INTERNAL REVIEW: LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE (NON-) EMERGENCE OF 
DISPUTES (2003); Russell Engler, When Does Representation Matter?, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO 
CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 71 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016); William L.F. Felstiner et al., 
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 
(1980–1981); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and 
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); 
Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canada 
and the United States, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 499 (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., To Confront or Not to 
Confront: Measuring Claiming Rates in Discrimination Grievances, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 875 (1991); Sally 
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developed through the Civil Litigation Research Project, this research describes the 
process through which events ultimately become (or do not become) legal disputes. 
These studies propose that dispute processing begins when occurrences are named as 
injurious experiences.23 Next, individuals who perceive an experience as injurious may 
blame another.24 This turns the dispute into a grievance, which means that the individual 
feels that “he or she . . . is entitled to a resource which someone else may grant or 
deny.”25 In order to register this sentiment and seek recompense, the individual must 
make a claim.26 If the individual is not satisfied with the other party’s response to the 
claim, a dispute arises.27   
 In offensive consumer litigation, it is the consumer who initiates private litigation 
after naming an event as harmful, blaming a business for the event and resulting harm, 
and seeking relief by making a claim. To consider the actions of consumer defendants, 
one must extend this framework28 because defensive consumer litigation involves a 
different set of questions faced by consumer defendants after business plaintiffs have 
named, blamed, and claimed.  
In that situation, the consumer defendant must decide whether to acquiesce to the 
demands of the claimant or escalate the conflict.29 Acquiescence requires that the 
defendant satisfy the plaintiff, by surrendering all of what was requested or the portion 
thereof that the plaintiff finds acceptable. If that occurs, the issue is settled before further 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lloyd-Bostock, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of America: The Role of Attribution 
Processes, 18 J. L. & SOC’Y 428 (1991); Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? 
— How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 105 (1990); Richard E. Miller & Austin 
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 525 (1980–
1981); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? — An Empirical Analysis of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663 (2005); Jack Ladinsky & Charles 
Susmilch, Conceptual and Operational Issues in Measuring Consumer Disputing Behavior (Disputes 
Processing Resolution Program, Univ. of Wis.-Madison Law Sch., Working Paper No. 1981-3, 1981). A 
related, but distinct, literature focuses on individuals’ legal needs. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 16; 
BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 
(1977); HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW (1999); 
SANDEFUR, supra note 16; W.A. Bogart & Neil Vidmar, Problems and Experiences with the Ontario Civil 
Justice System: An Empirical Assessment, in ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1990); 
Leon Mayhew & Albert J. Reiss Jr., The Social Organization of Legal Contacts, 34 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 309 
(1969); Masayuki Murayama, Experiences of Problems and Disputing Behavior in Japan, 14 MEIJI L.J. 1 
(2007).  
23 Felstiner et al., supra note 22, at 633. 
24 Id. at 635. 
25 Miller & Sarat, supra note 22, at 527. 
26 Felstiner et al., supra note 22, at 635–36.  
27 Id. Other research emphasizes the importance of interactions between the parties and the endogeneity 
between the disputing process and perceptions of disputes. Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Linda Mulcahy, The 
Social Psychology of Making and Responding to Hospital Complaints: An Account Model of Complaint 
Processes, 16 LAW & POL’Y 123, 130 (1994). 
28 While empirical work has documented differences in dispute processing between individuals who are 
claimants and those who are respondents, GENN, supra note 22, at 152, conceptual work has focused almost 
exclusively on the actions of individual claimants.  
29 See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POWER 96  (2d ed. 
2005) (offering a similar expansion to Felstiner et al.’s Naming, Blaming, Claiming model, proposing that 
two outcomes are possible after a claim is made: “acceptance, leading to agreement, and denial, leading to 
argument”). 
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conflict emerges and never ripens into a dispute. Alternatively, the defendant could 
escalate the conflict by refusing to comply with the demands of the plaintiff, attempting 
unsuccessfully to satisfy the plaintiff, or by failing to respond. 
If the defendant chooses to escalate the conflict, the conflict still may not become a 
dispute because it is up to the claimant to move forward. Some plaintiffs, despite not 
receiving an acceptable response from the respondent, may decide to “clump it”—
foregoing further action and lumping it after having made a claim.30 If the plaintiff does 
decide to move forward, the conflict will become a dispute. At this point, the defendant 
must decide whether to defend against the claim or default. In order to defend 
themselves, defendants must answer the claim and fulfill any other procedurally-
mandated requirements.31 Those who fail to do so default, losing their right to participate 
in the proceedings.32  
Thus, consumer defendants who decide not to engage in a legal dispute initiated by 
a business plaintiff face consequences imposed by the adjudicator. In this way, consumer 
defendants who default differ from consumer plaintiffs who lump it and suffer nothing 
worse than the status quo. In addition, although the adjudicator imposes consequences on 
defendants who attempt to defend themselves and are unsuccessful and those who 
default, the outcome may be mediated where defendants participate, either as a result of 
negotiation with the plaintiff or through the court’s discretion.  
Among those defendants who decide to defend, some will lawyer up and obtain 
legal counsel, while others will go it alone. This need not follow the other decisions 
temporally; some individuals retain legal counsel immediately upon being notified of a 
claim and many will hire lawyers at the initiation of a legal dispute to avoid defaulting. 
The presence of legal counsel, however, reflects not only the desire and ability of the 
defendant to seek legal representation, but a lawyer’s agreement to become involved in 
the case. Lawyers may serve as catalysts, assisting in the progression of disputes, or as 
gatekeepers, diffusing disputes and channeling them away from the formal legal 
progress.33 In this way, lawyers may influence the trajectory of a dispute as well as its 
outcome.   
Thus, the dispute process for consumer defendants involves decisions—acquiesce 
or escalate, defend or default—that diverge from those of consumer plaintiffs deciding 
whether to name, blame, and claim. Several different factors influence their decisions, 
and potentially encourage or discourage consumer defending. One factor that encourages 
consumer defensive action, while potentially limiting legal action among consumer 
plaintiffs, is the fact that the issue facing them has been defined as a legal problem. 
Among individual plaintiffs, the failure to perceive the problem they are experiencing as 
a legal problem is a common explanation for their legal inaction.34 For consumer 
defendants, the presence of a legal problem is clear: they have been sued.  
The stakes involved can also influence legal behavior. Individuals are more likely 
to engage in the legal process and to obtain legal representation when there is more at 
                                                          
30 Ladinsky & Susmilch, supra note 22, at 14. 
31 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.19 (5th ed. 2015). 
32 Id. 
33 Galanter, supra note 22, at 19.  
34 SANDEFUR, supra note 16, at 14.  
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stake,35 which is likely a factor for consumers as both plaintiffs and defendants.36 The 
qualitative nature of what is at stake may also influence behavior37 as does the cultural 
meaning of the dispute,38 particularly when triggering feelings of self-blame and limiting 
the desirability of engaging in a legal dispute.39 On these dimensions, there may be 
important differences between consumer plaintiffs and defendants. In debt collection 
cases, in particular, raising an affirmative substantive defense or a procedural defense 
requires that the consumer defendant acknowledge his or her failure to live up to financial 
obligations. The moral dimensions of this process may serve to discourage legal action by 
consumer defendants, even where a valid defense exists.40    
A third factor influencing individuals’ willingness and ability to engage in litigation 
is the burden imposed by participation.41 As an initial matter, consumers may not 
understand how to participate in the action.42 Even when they are able to determine what 
is necessary to engage in the litigation, participation requires debtors to find their way to 
unfamiliar or inconvenient courthouses, which may also interfere with work or childcare 
schedules.43 Additionally, attorney costs serve as deterrents to legal action by consumers, 
particularly where the stakes are low relative to the likely fees.44  
Thus, the series of decisions that consumer defendants face, and the factors that 
may influence their decisions, differ from consumer plaintiffs. The next section considers 
how structural inequalities in the litigation process may also differentially influence the 
trajectory of their disputes.  
2. Structural Inequalities in Defensive Consumer Litigation 
The inequalities between businesses and consumers that give rise to consumer 
protections in transactions45 are paralleled in the civil litigation context. In part, this 
                                                          
35 Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is that the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
875, 899 (2008); Miller & Sarat, supra note 22, at 547. 
36 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 1.2 (2017). 
37 Julie Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 663, 667 (2001).  
38 Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? — Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 
9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 157 (1984). 
39 KITTY CALAVITA & VALERIE JENNESS, APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS, AND 
CARCERAL LOGIC 78 (2014); Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of 
Disputes, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 655, 665 (1980–1981). 
40 See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 239 (2006) (noting the history of 
stigma associated with bankruptcy and its continued impact); Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking 
Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 972 
(2010). 
41 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL 
COURT 200, 227 (1979) (investigating the deterrent effect of procedural burdens); see also Arthur Best & 
Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, 
Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 L. & SOC’Y REV. 701, 715 (1977) (noting that consumer 
complaints are “made against the background of widespread knowledge that complaining can be difficult 
and costly”). 
42 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 19, at 206–10.  
43 See generally FEELEY, supra note 41; see also CAPLOVITZ, supra note 19, at 202, 207–11. 
44 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 19, at 222. 
45 Consumer protections are often justified as responses to market failures that result from consumers’ 
limited bargaining power relative to that of businesses. Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Economics of 
Consumer Debt Collection and Its Regulation, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 167, 198–99 (2016).  
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derives from businesses’ status as “repeat players” and consumers’ role as “one-shotters.” 
As Professor Marc Galanter describes in his foundational work, repeat players are 
parties—often larger and with significant resources—who litigate frequently and evaluate 
individual disputes in the context of a portfolio of cases.46 One-shotters, in contrast, are 
parties who rarely litigate, and for whom the stakes in a given case are high.  
As a result of repeated exposure to the courts, repeat players enjoy a number of 
advantages, including the benefit of accumulated prior knowledge, access to experts, and 
the ability to protect long-term interests through the development of favorable 
precedent.47 These advantages help to explain why repeat players—the “haves” in 
litigation—so often come out ahead.48 One-shotters, in contrast, enjoy none of these 
advantages: they have no familiarity with the process, no easy access to legal counsel, 
and no input in the development of relevant precedent.49  
These structural inequalities between repeat player businesses and one-shotter 
consumers are well-recognized in consumer law.50 However, a further distinction has 
been afforded less attention. Varying the identities of the plaintiff and defendant 
generates four types of litigation: repeat player versus repeat player (RP v. RP); one-
shotter versus one-shotter (OS v. OS); one-shotter versus repeat player (OS v. RP); and 
repeat player versus one-shotter (RP v. OS).51 Most research on structural inequalities in 
litigation is focused on OS v. RP litigation and seeks to understand whether and why 
repeat players are more likely to win.52 Consistent with this theme, scholarship on legal 
action by consumers has generally considered obstacles to the ability of consumers to 
bring legal action against businesses.53  
By focusing on consumer defendants, this Article instead considers a form of RP v. 
OS litigation54 and seeks to understand how the advantages of repeat players influence 
the quantity and quality of legal action by consumer defendants. In particular, this Article 
considers how advanced intelligence, access to specialists, and the ability to engage in 
selective litigation may limit consumer defendants’ legal action.  
In consumer transactions, it is the business that is generally able to shape the 
transaction.55 Savvy businesses anticipate future litigation when structuring the initial 
transaction, and are thus able to shape the dispute process.56 This includes the use of 
provisions requiring mandatory arbitration, determining choice of law, limiting the 
availability of class actions, and allocating fees and costs.57 In the case of defensive 
                                                          
46 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–98 (1974). 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 1.2. 
51 Galanter, supra note 46, at 107. 
52 For an overview, see Shauhin Talesh, How the “Haves” Come out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 
DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 524–25 (2013).  
53 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law in 
the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663 (2008). 
54 This type of litigation involves the “routine processing of claims by parties for whom the making of such 
claims is a regular business activity.” Galanter, supra note 46, at 108.  
55 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 19, at 3; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 1.1.  
56 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 36, § 1.2. 
57 Id.  
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consumer litigation, this benefit is exacerbated by a business’s ability to also choose the 
venue and forum, and to control the timing of the litigation (subject, of course, to civil 
procedural rules and challenges).58  
Access to specialists is another benefit enjoyed by repeat players—and generally 
not enjoyed by one-shotters—that may be especially relevant in the context of defensive 
consumer litigation. Repeat players not only have access to lawyers, but also to 
specialists. In contrast, one-shotter consumers are likely to have less access to legal 
counsel and the lawyers available to them are less likely to have elite credentials or 
practice in prestigious settings. While these lawyers may be specialists in the relevant 
area of law, the “episodic and isolated nature” of their work for a given one-shotter limits 
their ability to develop optimizing strategies because they must manage each case 
individually.59  
These inequalities are implicit in any case involving repeat players and one-
shotters. However, in RP v. OS litigation, where the one-shotter is the defendant, the 
consequences are likely more extreme. Consumer plaintiffs benefit from the availability 
of contingent fee lawyers, high-volume practices,60 and class actions; consumer 
defendants do not. This has implications not only for consumer defendants’ ability to 
obtain legal counsel, but also the kind of counsel available to them. Moreover, it means 
that consumer defendants are more likely to experience all of the burdens of litigation—
attending court hearings, meeting filing deadlines, and drafting legal documents—
personally, without the assistance of legal counsel.  
Finally, repeat players are able to engage in strategically selective litigation, which 
may further disadvantage consumer respondents. Businesses bringing suit against 
consumers can set the pace of litigation and can choose to settle or litigate individual 
cases. This may limit awareness of systemic issues and, over time, can influence the 
development of law. While this can occur in all litigation between repeat players and one-
shotters, the effects may be magnified in RP v. OS litigation, where, as plaintiff, the 
repeat player enjoys greater control of the litigation. 
3. Substantive Consumer and Procedural Defenses 
The distinction between defensive and offensive consumer law, as forms of OS v. 
RP and RP v. OS litigation, also has important implications for the substance and form of 
legal action undertaken by consumers.61 Consumer plaintiffs initiate legal action on the 
basis of causes of action provided by substantive consumer law. Consumer defendants 
may also invoke substantive consumer law, but in the form of affirmative substantive 
defenses.62 For example, consumer defendants may be entitled to relief as a result of 
flaws in the underlying transaction or the use of unfair or deceptive debt collection 
                                                          
58 See Edward A. Purcell Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, 
and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992) (discussing the practical significance of forum 
selection generally and the potential benefits it affords to plaintiffs).  
59 Galanter, supra note 46, at 117. 
60 Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 829 (2011). 
61 See PORTER, supra note 12, at 425 (“It matters dramatically to the design of the remedies [in consumer 
law] whether the business or consumer is more likely to be the party that files the lawsuit.”). 
62 Some situations may also give rise to causes of action that consumers may pursue through offensive 
consumer litigation.  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY                 [2019      
 160 
practices.63 Consumer defendants may also raise procedural defenses, such as lack of 
standing, statutes of limitation, and evidentiary defenses.64 In this way, legal action by 
consumer defendants can serve an important monitoring and enforcement function for 
both substantive and procedural law, but one that differs from that offered by consumer 
plaintiffs. 
C. Optimizing Consumer Defending 
Consumer defendants’ failure to participate in civil litigation may result not only in 
harms to the consumer,65 but uncurbed illegal behavior.66 Defensive consumer litigation 
can prevent abuses of the civil legal system and ensure that all parties—even powerful 
ones—comply with procedural and legal requirements.67 Even if such enforcement does 
not alter the outcome of a given case, ensuring adherence to civil processes may enhance 
the expressive function of law.68   
This raises empirical and normative questions about the optimal level of legal 
action among consumer defendants.69 Determining this level requires consideration of all 
aspects of the applicable enforcement regime, including regulatory action and public 
litigation, and will vary across substantive areas. The goal of this Article is to identify 
forces that impact the quantity and quality of legal action among consumer defendants. 
This, in turn, has implications for policymakers’ efforts to generate optimal levels of 
legal action.  
II. AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION: THE RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESS  
The foregoing highlights the unique circumstances of consumer defendants. This 
Part offers an empirical illustration of the behavior of consumer defendants in response to 
a legal claim filed against them in one type of case: residential foreclosures. Using an 
original dataset of residential foreclosure cases initiated in New York City between 2007 
and 2011, this Part illustrates how incentives and structural inequalities discourage 
defensive legal activity among these consumer defendants. More specifically, the 
empirical study describes the actions of homeowner defendants and lender plaintiffs 
within the legal foreclosure process, including their use of legal representation, and also 
explores the outcomes obtained in each case. The study offers insights into the 
foreclosure process, with implications for understanding defensive consumer litigation 
                                                          
63 For an overview, see Peter A. Holland, Defending Junk-Debt-Buyer Lawsuits, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: 
J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 12 (2012); Clinton Rooney, Defense of Assigned Consumer Debts, 43 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 542 (2010).  
64 Holland, supra note 63; Rooney, supra note 63. 
65 These can be direct or indirect. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., When Unpaid Student Loan Bills 
Mean You Can No Longer Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business/student-loans-licenses.html. 
66 See David A. Dana, Why Mortgage “Formalities” Matter, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 505, 507 (2012) 
(arguing that enforcing compliance with foreclosure formalities is important for reforming the behavior of 
lenders and servicers); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public 
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1152, 1176, 1189 (2012); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private 
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998).  
67 Dana, supra note 66, at 507. 
68 Id. at 508. 
69 This is similar to debates about the optimal level of private enforcement. Glover, supra note 66, at 1189.  
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more broadly.  
A residential foreclosure action terminates a borrower’s ability to repay a 
promissory note secured by a mortgage on a residential property as a result of the 
borrower’s failure to comply with the terms of the promissory note (generally by failing 
to make timely payments). After foreclosing the right of repayment, the property is sold 
to allow the plaintiff to recover the unpaid principal and any outstanding interest or fees.  
Residential foreclosures have significant implications not only for individual 
homeowners and families, but also more broadly. Homeowners who lose their home to 
foreclosure may lose equity invested in the home and have reduced access to credit.70 In 
addition, individuals who experience foreclosure face a forced relocation that may lead to 
declines in housing quality,71 which can have detrimental consequences for affected 
family members.72 The significance of foreclosure is also evidenced by its association 
with increases in the risk of mental and physical health problems.73 This, of course, is not 
to mention repercussions for neighborhoods,74 including increased racial residential 
segregation,75 declines in housing values,76 increases in crime,77 and reduced civil 
                                                          
70 See White, supra note 40, at 983 n.49 (reporting an estimated decline in credit rating of up to 400 points 
from late payments and foreclosure); Kenneth P. Brevoort & Cheryl R. Cooper, Foreclosure’s Wake: The 
Credit Experiences of Individuals Following Foreclosure 15 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion 
Series, Working Paper No. 2010-59, 2010), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/201059/201059pap.pdf. However, White also argues that 
the “actual financial cost of having a poor credit score for a few years . . . is not likely to be significant for 
most individuals” relative to the potential costs of staying in an underwater mortgage. White, supra note 
40, at 984–85. 
71 Matthew Hall et al., Foreclosure Migration and Neighborhood Outcomes: Moving Toward Segregation 
and Disadvantage, 70 SOC. SCI. RESEARCH 107, 113 (2017) (finding that foreclosure-induced moves were 
linked to migration to more racially segregated and disadvantaged neighborhoods); Raven Molloy & Hui 
Shan, The Post-Foreclosure Experience of U.S. Households in the Current Housing Market Downturn, 41 
REAL ESTATE ECON. 225, 228 (2013) (noting that individuals who have experienced foreclosure are more 
likely to move to denser areas with lower homeownership rates and lower household incomes, although the 
magnitude of the differences was limited); Anne Julian Martin, After Foreclosure: The Social and Spatial 
Reconstruction of Everyday Lives in the San Francisco Bay Area (Fall 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author) (observing that, although individuals 
did not move far from their foreclosed homes, they still “had to make difficult compromises in terms of the 
[new] housing or location, in order to take what was offered”).  
72 See JULIA B. ISAACS, BROOKINGS INST., THE ONGOING IMPACT OF FORECLOSURES ON CHILDREN 3 
(2012); NAT’L ASSOC. FOR THE EDUC. OF HOMELESS CHILDREN & YOUTH, A CRITICAL MOMENT: CHILD 
AND YOUTH HOMELESSNESS IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 2 (2010) (reporting that thirty-eight percent of 
school districts cited the foreclosure crisis as the reason for an increase in homelessness among children 
enrolled in schools).  
73 Jason N. Houle, Mental Health in the Foreclosure Crisis, 118 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 5 (2014); Jason N. 
Houle & Michael T. Light, The Home Foreclosure Crisis and Rising Suicide Rates, 2005 to 2010, 104 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1075 (2014); Craig Evan Pollack & Julia Lynch, Health Status of People 
Undergoing Foreclosure in the Philadelphia Region, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1833, 1835 (2009); Craig 
Evan Pollack et al., A Case-Controlled Study of Home Foreclosure, Health Conditions, and Health Care 
Utilization, 88 J. URB. HEALTH 469, 474–75 (2011); Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is the Foreclosure Crisis 
Making Us Sick? 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17310, 2011).  
74 DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND THE UNDERMINING OF 
AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 146 (2009). 
75 Hall et al., supra note 71, at 108.  
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participation.78 And, as the 2008 Financial Crisis made clear, residential foreclosures can 
also have widespread implications for the stability of the housing market and the wider 
economy.  
 This study focuses on the foreclosure process in New York City before and during 
the Financial Crisis. I begin by describing the significance of this setting, which I argue is 
particularly well suited to evaluating the willingness and ability of consumer defendants 
to engage in defensive consumer litigation. I then describe the unique dataset of 
residential foreclosure cases used in the analysis before presenting the results. In the final 
section, I briefly consider the implications of the findings.     
A. Empirical Study Setting 
The genesis of the Financial Crisis and its relationship to residential foreclosures 
and the parallel Foreclosure Crisis are well established. As the housing bubble of the 
early 2000s burst, rates of mortgage default and foreclosure increased dramatically.79 The 
value of mortgage-backed securities declined precipitously as a result, setting off a chain 
of events that in 2008 destabilized the global markets.80 This study focuses on foreclosure 
cases that arose out of lis pendens filed between 2007 and 2011, as the Foreclosure Crisis 
began and expanded. The aim of the sections below is to highlight the characteristics that 
make this time period a valuable context in which to evaluate defensive consumer 
litigation. The section also describes the benefits of the study’s jurisdictional focus on 
New York State and the sampling frame, which generates a representative sample of 
foreclosure cases in New York City.  
1. The Foreclosure Crisis 
During the Financial Crisis and the related Foreclosure Crisis, there were a number 
of events that may have increased rates of homeowner participation in the litigation 
process.81 These include increased incentives to litigate and greater awareness among 
                                                                                                                                                                             
76 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 69 (2006); cf. Kristopher 
Gerardi et al., Foreclosure Externalities: Some New Evidence, 87 J. URB. ECON. 42, 43 (2015) (finding that 
delinquent mortgages are associated with only small decreases in nearby home values and that the effect is 
tied to the condition of the distressed property). 
77 See e.g., Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Do Foreclosures Cause Crime?, 74 J. URB. ECON 59, 68 (2012); but 
see David S. Kirk & Derek S. Hyra, Home Foreclosures and Community Crime: Causal or Spurious 
Association?, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 648, 663 (2012) (concluding that the positive association between residential 
foreclosure and crime in Chicago is spurious).  
78 Vanesa Estrada-Correa & Martin Johnson, Foreclosure Depresses Voter Turnout: Neighborhood 
Disruption and the 2008 Presidential Election in California, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 559, 573 (2012). 
79 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 402 (2011); see also Press 
Release, CoreLogic, Inc., CoreLogic Reports 57,000 Completed Foreclosures in September (Oct. 31, 2012) 
(on file with author) (reporting 83,000 completed foreclosures nationwide in September 2011, compared to 
an average of 21,000 per month between 2000 and 2006). 
80 IMMERGLUCK, supra note 74, at 3 (noting that investors in mortgage-backed securities suffered direct 
losses between $350 and $420 billion, with total losses estimated at $2 trillion or more); David S. 
Hilzenrath, 2010 Worst Year for Bank Failures Since 1992, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/28/AR2010122803649.html. 
81 Depressed home values and the restriction of credit during the Financial Crisis served as countervailing 
forces. We lack data on homeowner participation in the foreclosure legal process over time, making it 
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consumers of potential defenses, as well as a decline in the stigma associated with 
defensive consumer legal action. Because these circumstances may have made legal 
action by consumer defendants more likely, this time period offers a unique opportunity 
to observe potential variation in the actions of consumer defendants.  
When deciding whether to participate in litigation brought against them, consumer 
defendants must consider the costs of participation and the potential benefits offered by 
such engagement. For many homeowners, this calculus likely changed during the 
Financial Crisis. Borrowers who are able to obtain alternate financing have generally 
been able to satisfy the debt to avoid foreclosure.82 And, lenders have always had the 
option of agreeing to a short sale, in which the homeowner sells the home and turns the 
proceeds over to the lender, avoiding the additional financial repercussions of 
foreclosure.83 However, during the Financial Crisis, another alternative outcome became 
more salient: loan modifications designed to allow homeowners to remain in their homes 
by renegotiating the terms of the loan.84 Although some modifications were the result of 
private loss mitigation efforts, many were a function of government interventions.85 
Some of these programs generated a defense to foreclosure because lenders were required 
to review a homeowner’s application prior to completing a foreclosure. Of course, if the 
homeowner failed to qualify for a loan modification, the lender could still move forward 
with the foreclosure.86 In fact, many homeowners who applied for loan modifications 
were denied,87 meaning that the defense represented merely a delay. Nevertheless, it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
impossible to assess historical trends. We also have a limited understanding of how patterns of homeowner 
behavior in response to foreclosure differ during times of financial crisis relative to more stable periods, 
when there are fewer foreclosures. This study provides a first step toward addressing these questions.  
82 GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 6.1 (6th ed. 2015).  
83 Id. § 6.20. 
84 See HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, INTRODUCTION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE 
MODIFICATION PROGRAM 1 (2009), 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd0901.pdf (introducing HAMP); Letter 
from Brian D. Montgomery, Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to HUD-approved mortgagees and appraisers (Oct. 1, 
2008), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/loan_mod/hope/lmp_hope_origination_guidelines.
pdf (introducing the H4H Program); Press Release, Fed. Hous. & Fin. Agency, FHFA Authorizes Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to Expand Home Affordable Refinance Program to 125 Percent Loan-to-Value (July 
1, 2009), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Authorizes-Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-
Mac-to-Expand-Home-Affordable-Refinance-Program-to-125-Percent-Loan-to-Value.aspx (describing the 
expansion of HARP).  
85 HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, supra note 84; Letter from Brian D. Montgomery to all 
HUD-approved mortgagees and appraisers, supra note 84; Press Release, Fed. Housing & Fin. Agency, 
supra note 84. 
86 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FORECLOSURE MITIGATION: AGENCIES COULD IMPROVE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL EFFORTS WITH ADDITIONAL DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 18–19 (2012), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592028.pdf. 
87 In part, this reflected the role of securitization in mortgage lending and the failure of servicers to engage 
in loss-mitigation efforts. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, EVALUATING PROGRESS ON TARP 
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 72 (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
111JPRT55737/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT55737.pdf (In noting the limited success of HAMP, the Panel asked, 
“So the following question arises: why is HAMP not resulting in more loan modifications? It appears that 
in many cases the program’s incentive structure is not sufficient to overcome other disincentives that are 
affecting the decisions made by servicers and investors.”); Samuel Kruger, The Effect of Mortgage 
Securitization on Foreclosure and Modification, 129 J. FIN. ECON. 586, 587 (2018) (noting that securitized 
loans in default were more likely to be foreclosed and less likely to be modified, and noting that the results 
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offered an additional incentive for homeowners to participate in the foreclosure process.  
The realization that the chains of title giving rise to some lenders’ interests were 
incomplete or invalid offered another incentive for homeowners to contest foreclosures. 
Mortgage securitization and increased activity in the secondary mortgage market, 
combined with banks’ use of a private company—Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Services, Inc. (MERS)—to track interests in mortgage loans resulted in the potential for 
gaps in the chain of title from loan origination to current holder.88 To plug these gaps, 
some lenders engaged in “robo-signing” to generate fraudulent documents in the chain of 
assignments. Accordingly, some plaintiffs that were unable to prove their interest in the 
note were found to lack standing to bring the foreclosure action.89   
In other cases, lenders incorrectly calculated fees or improperly applied payments. 
A government audit of the fourteen largest mortgage servicers, which accounted for more 
than two-thirds of the servicing market, found “critical weaknesses” in the servicers’ 
processes that “resulted in unsafe and unsound practices and violations of applicable 
federal and state law and requirements.”90 Professor Katherine Porter documented the 
impact of these practices in bankruptcy court, where many families attempted to save 
their homes from foreclosure.91 In a review of 1,700 bankruptcy filings, she found that 
lenders frequently failed to comply with bankruptcy law requirements regarding the 
substantiation and calculation of amounts due.92 Studies of MERS’s records93 and 
foreclosure filings94 also documented irregularities.  
The existence of foreclosure defenses was widely noted, and may have increased 
homeowners’ likelihood of engaging in the foreclosure process. In addition, some states 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“imply that approximately 950,000 of the 5.3 million foreclosures experienced since the start of the 
Financial Crisis were caused by securitization”); Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 
28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 12 n.26 (2011); Tomasz Piskorski et al., Securitization and Distressed Loan 
Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 369, 377 (2010) (noting that 
securitized mortgage loans in default are less likely to be modified than non-securitized loans with similar 
characteristics); Sumit Agarwal et al., Market-Based Loss Mitigation Practices for Troubled Mortgages 
Following the Financial Crisis 16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2011-03, 2011) 
88 NELSON ET AL., supra note 82, § 5.34.  
89 See Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, A Standing Question: Mortgages, Assignment, and Foreclosure, 
40 J. CORP. L. 705, 719 (2015) (noting potential standing defenses and criticizing courts’ unwillingness to 
allow defendants to raise them). 
90 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, FED. RESERVE 
SYS.,  INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2–3 (2011) (finding that in most 
cases the servicer possessed documentation sufficient to establish the foreclosing party’s interest in the 
note, but that the documentation was not always present in foreclosure files and there was insufficient 
oversight in the preparation of affidavits asserting the party’s interest). 
91 Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 123 
(2008). 
92 Id. at 146–52. 
93 Alan M. White, Losing the Paper — Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers, and Consumer Protection, 
24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 474–76 (2012).  
94 See James Geoffrey Durham, Avoiding a Lawyers’ Race to the Foreclosure Bottom: Some Advice to 
Lawyers for Lenders and Borrowers on Their Roles in Foreclosure Litigation, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 419, 
421–26 (2012) (summarizing the findings of an audit of non-judicial foreclosures in San Francisco by the 
San Francisco Office of the Assessor-Recorder); Megan Barnett & Abigail Field, At Bank of America, 
More Incomplete Mortgage Docs Raise More Questions, FORTUNE (June 3, 2011), 
http://fortune.com/2011/06/03/at-bank-of-america-more-incomplete-mortgage-docs-raise-more-questions. 
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adopted procedural protections for homeowners in the wake of the Financial Crisis, 
including enhanced notice and pleading requirements, settlement conferences, and 
housing counseling.95 These procedural protections also encouraged greater participation 
among homeowners facing foreclosure.  
Finally, homeowners facing foreclosure during this time period may have been 
better equipped to overcome the stigma that is often associated with defensive consumer 
litigation. While foreclosure is associated with feelings of mistrust, insecurity, anxiety,96 
and shame that can shape homeowners’ behavior,97 the Financial Crisis was a unique 
period. Awareness of the frequency of mortgage default and the role of lenders in 
precipitating the Foreclosure Crisis may have eased homeowners’ feelings of self-blame, 
increasing their likelihood of engaging in the foreclosure process.98     
Together, these trends may have encouraged homeowner participation in the 
foreclosure process.99 This differentiates foreclosures from other types of defensive 
consumer litigation, where one would expect higher rates of default. In this way, the 
study offers a valuable situation in which to evaluate legal action among consumer 
defendants.  
2. The Residential Foreclosure Process in New York, New York 
This study’s focus on foreclosures in New York City under New York state law 
offers further analytic benefits. Foreclosures happen as of right outside of the court 
system in many states,100 making it nearly impossible to track the actions of homeowners 
in response. However, twenty-one states, including New York, require that lenders file a 
civil legal action to foreclose.101 This generates a public court record that makes it 
possible to track the behavior of lenders and homeowners in the legal foreclosure process. 
Because the judicial foreclosure process is seen as more favorable to participation by 
homeowners, it also generates conservative estimates of legal inaction among 
homeowners.102 
                                                          
95 See Heather Morton, Foreclosures 2016 Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 
21, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/foreclosures-2016-
legislation.aspx (identifying foreclosure legislation adopted by state legislatures, by year); sources cited 
infra note 140 (describing the procedural reforms adopted in New York state).  
96 Lauren M. Ross & Gregory D. Squires, The Personal Costs of Subprime Lending and the Foreclosure 
Crisis: A Matter of Trust, Insecurity, and Institutional Deception, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 140, 151–52 (2011). 
97 See Lindsay A. Owens, Intrinsically Advantageous? Reexamining the Production of Class Advantage in 
the Case of Home Mortgage Modification, 93 SOC. FORCES 1185, 1198–1200 (2015) (documenting feelings 
of shame among homeowners experiencing foreclosure and these feelings’ influence over middle-class 
homeowners’ actions).  
98 See Karen McCormack, Credit and Credibility: Homeownership and Identity Management in the Midst 
of the Foreclosure Crisis, 55 SOC. Q. 261, 279 (2014). 
99 On the other hand, high rates of default and foreclosure were a function of decreased housing values that 
may have depressed consumer defendants’ willingness to engage in litigation. 
100 NELSON ET AL., supra note 82, § 7.20. 
101 Id.  
102 See JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS 
DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC PROTECTIONS 3–4 (2009) (arguing that some nonjudicial-foreclosure 
states offer homeowners fewer protections than renters); Timothy A. Froehle, Standing in the Wake of the 
Foreclosure Crisis: Why Procedural Requirements Are Necessary to Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 1719, 1724 (2011); Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial 
Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time Bomb?, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 139 (2013) (discussing the 
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The majority of foreclosures in New York are filed in the state’s trial court—the 
New York State Supreme Court.103 A case begins when the lender files a lis pendens104 in 
the land records in the county where the property is located, providing notice of the 
impending litigation.105 The lender must provide notice and serve all necessary parties 
with a summons and complaint106 before filing the proof of service and a Request for 
Judicial Intervention with the court. The homeowner can respond by filing an answer. If 
the homeowner answers the complaint, the lender will generally move for summary 
judgment. If the court grants the lender’s motion for summary judgment, or if the 
homeowner does not file an answer or admits the allegations of the complaint, then the 
court will appoint a referee. The referee computes the balance due to the bank, which is 
confirmed in the order of reference.107 A judgment of foreclosure and sale is then entered, 
giving the lender the right to sell the property at a court-sanctioned auction. If, in 
contrast, the homeowner and lender are able to negotiate an alternative to foreclosure, the 
lender may discontinue the case, generally without prejudice.108 During the Financial 
Crisis, the New York State foreclosure process was reformed to include settlement 
conferences, expanded notice requirements, and heightened pleading requirements; it is 
now one of the lengthiest foreclosure processes in the nation.109  
To limit court variation while generating a sample that is representative of a sizable 
portion of all foreclosure cases filed in the state,110 this study is focused on residential 
foreclosure cases filed in the five boroughs of New York City: the Bronx, Brooklyn 
(Kings County), Queens, Manhattan (New York County), and Staten Island (Richmond 
County). This sample also encompasses a diverse housing stock and population.  
B. Residential Foreclosure Case Dataset 
To generate a representative sample of New York City foreclosure cases, I began 
with a proprietary dataset acquired from RealtyTrac. RealtyTrac is a private company 
that collects public data from land records, including information about properties that 
enter the foreclosure process, to sell to potential investors.111 The dataset identified all lis 
pendens filed between 2007 and 2011 in connection with residential properties in the five 
                                                                                                                                                                             
potential implications of faulty assignments for the stability of foreclosure sales in nonjudicial-foreclosure 
states).  
103 See Justin Wagner, Assisting Distressed Homeowners to Avoid Foreclosure: An Advocate’s Role in an 
Evolving Judicial and Policy Environment, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 423, 427 (2010) (noting 
that while foreclosure cases can be filed in other courts, they rarely are). 
104 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1331 (McKinney 1962); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6501 (MCKINNEY 1993). 
105 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 507 (MCKINNEY 1962). 
106 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1303 (McKinney 2016). 
107 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1321 (McKinney 1962). 
108 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3217(c) (MCKINNEY 2012). 
109 New York Foreclosure Laws, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-guides/foreclosure-
laws/new-york-foreclosure-laws/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (“New York foreclosures can take up to 15 
months, which is longer than most other states.”). 
110 JUDGE ANN PFAU, STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2010 REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE COURTS 4 (2010), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/files/2018-
06/foreclosurereportnov2010.pdf (reporting that New York City foreclosures account for nearly 30% of all 
foreclosure filings in the state). 
111 “RealtyTrac offers a one-stop shop for homes buyers, investors, and other real estate professionals. 
You’ll get access to the largest selection of foreclosures, foreclosed homes for sale, MLS listings, auctions 
and bank-owned homes.” REALTYTRAC, https://www.realtytrac.com/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). 
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boroughs of New York City. Because a lis pendens is filed prior to the initiation of a 
foreclosure case in New York State, this identified the universe of potential foreclosure 
cases. From this dataset, I drew a random sample of lis pendens, stratified by year and 
county.112   
I matched the lis pendens to court cases by plaintiff and defendant name and date of 
filing using the New York State Court System’s online case summary. In doing so, I 
excluded non-foreclosure cases and foreclosure cases involving non-individual 
defendants and non-lender plaintiffs (e.g., tax liens). For those cases remaining in the 
sample where a court case was identified, the court records were retrieved from online 
sources (Brooklyn and Manhattan) and county clerks’ offices (Bronx, Queens, and Staten 
Island).  
These court records, including the complaint and any appearance, answer, order, 
order of reference, or judgment of foreclosure and sale, were then reviewed. From this 
review, the identities of the parties and their representatives were coded, as was 
information about the timing, form, and content of any pleadings they filed. The outcome 
of each case was also determined. In addition, the terms of the loan and its history, from 
origination through default, were noted. The location of the property that secured the loan 
was drawn from the complaint and matched to Census data, providing information about 
the characteristics of the population in the areas where the properties are located.  
The resulting dataset reveals the identities and characteristics of the lender 
plaintiffs, defendant homeowners, and any legal counsel involved. It also includes 
information about the form and content of pleadings the parties filed and the outcome of 
the case. Because I was unable to collect documents for some cases, I rely on a slightly 
reduced analytic sample for most analyses (n=938). Appendix Table 1 describes the 
proportion of cases in the sample filed in each county and year of case filing.113 There is 
often a delay between the filing of the lis pendens in anticipation of the civil action and 
the filing of the Request for Judicial Intervention, so the year of case filing ranges from 
2007 to 2013, even though the sample of lis pendens ranged from 2007 to 2011.  
C. Empirical Study Results 
Using this original dataset, the descriptive analyses below identify ways in which 
limited incentives and structural inequalities contribute to diminished legal participation 
among homeowner defendants. More specifically, the analysis considers the status of 
lenders and homeowners as repeat players and one-shotters, respectively. It then 
compares the use of legal representation among homeowner defendants and lender 
plaintiffs, and the types of lawyers available to each group. Next, it evaluates the actions 
taken by homeowners and lawyers within the legal process and concludes by describing 
the outcomes of the foreclosure cases.    
 
 
                                                          
112 Counties with a lower incidence of foreclosure were sampled at a higher rate in order to generate a 
sample size sufficient for statistical analysis. The sampling rate for each year in Bronx was 1.6%, Brooklyn 
0.8%, Manhattan 4.1%, Queens 0.8%, and Staten Island 1.6%. The observations are weighted in all 
analyses to make them representative of the population of foreclosure cases. 
113 The year of case filing is the year in which the request for judicial intervention was filed, or if none  
(n = 24), the date on which the complaint was signed. 
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1. Repeat Players and One-Shotters 
The lender plaintiffs in foreclosure actions are advantaged in multiple ways over 
the defaulted debtor because they are larger, have more resources, and routinely use the 
enforcement process. The identities of the plaintiffs in this sample of foreclosure cases 
highlight these inequalities. Many of the plaintiffs in these foreclosure actions are among 
the most powerful financial institutions in the world. The majority of the foreclosure 
actions were brought by large national banks, and just five banks—Wells Fargo, US 
Bank, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan Chase, and HSBC—account for more than half of all 
foreclosure cases.114 With thousands of pending foreclosures, the stakes in any given case 
are low for these plaintiffs.  
The opposite is likely true for the one-shotter homeowners, who may be further 
disadvantaged by their socioeconomic status. Because the data were drawn from court 
records, I know the identities, but not the demographic or socioeconomic characteristics 
of the defendant homeowners. However, I am able to describe the terms of the underlying 
loans and the characteristics of the locations of the properties subject to foreclosure.115 
The attributes of the neighborhood where the property is located offer important insights 
into the likely characteristics of the homeowners.  
The properties involved in the foreclosure cases are not randomly distributed across 
New York City, but are clustered in areas with higher concentrations of minority 
populations.116 Figure 1 maps the location of each property and indicates the proportion 
of the population on the block who are Black. It shows that properties in foreclosure are 
more prevalent in areas with more concentrated Black populations.117 On average, 42% 
of the population on the blocks where the properties are located are Black, compared with 
just 23% citywide.118 Figure 2 is a similar figure but indicates the rate of Hispanic 
population. While Figure 2 is consistent with clustering in minority areas, the link 
between the incidence of foreclosure and Hispanic population is less clear. And, on 
average, 24% of the population on the blocks where the properties are located is 
Hispanic, which is lower than the percent of residents that are Hispanic citywide (29%). 
                                                          
114 See infra App’x Table 2.  
115 By geocoding the locations of the properties, I was able to match the location of each foreclosure 
property to 2010 U.S. Census data. I use the most fine-grained data available for each variable of interest. 
In some cases, the data is at the block level, and other variables are available at the block-group level. 
116 In addition to suggesting the potential social disadvantage of homeowners, these patterns also raise 
concerns regarding discriminatory lending. 
117 Both Figure 1 and Figure 2 display results for the full sample of 955 cases. 
118 CENSUS BUREAU, RACE AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY RACE, 2010, Prepared by Social Explorer, 
https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/C2010/R11586843. 
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 While higher rates of foreclosure appear to be clustered in minority 
neighborhoods, the link between foreclosure and indicators of socio-economic 
disadvantage is less clear. The data do not provide strong evidence that the foreclosures 
were disproportionately located in economically disadvantaged areas. The median annual 
household income in the block groups where the properties are located was $57,680, in 
Figure 1. Foreclosure Case Property Locations with 
Proportion of Block Population that is Black  
 
 
Figure 2. Foreclosure Case Property Locations with 
Proportion of Block Population that is Hispanic  
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2012 inflation-adjusted dollars, which is close to the median household income citywide 
at the same time.119 In addition, there is little evidence that the underlying loans were for 
the purchase or refinancing of low-cost homes, relative to housing values citywide. Given 
that most loans are for an amount less than the full value of the home, the average 
principal amount of the loans, $444,102, is not drastically lower than the median housing 
value for owner-occupied housing units citywide at that time, $500,790.120   
However, other features of the underlying loans offer evidence of homeowners’ 
economic disadvantage. First, the time between origination and default is generally short, 
with some homeowners defaulting as early as the first month after origination. This may 
be indicative of homeowners’ limited economic resources, but it also raises questions 
about the quality of the underlying loans. Raising further concerns about the lending 
practices that generated these loans is the fact that most of the loans in the sample 
(regardless of the year in which the foreclosure case was filed) were originated in late 
2006. This is notable in light of patterns of mortgage lending in the period preceding the 
Financial Crisis. Rising housing values, decreased underwriting standards, and increased 
demand for mortgage-backed securities allowed borrowers who had lower credit scores, 
who were unable to fully document their income and assets, or who financed a greater 
proportion of the house’s purchase price (a higher loan-to-value ratio) to qualify for non-
traditional, sub-prime loans.121 The competition for borrowers created a race to the 
bottom in mortgage lending standards that reached its nadir in 2006, when most of the 
loans in the sample were originated.  
 To offset the higher risks of lending to subprime borrowers, loans included higher 
interest rates and/or adjustable interest rates (often with a low introductory teaser rates 
that reset as quickly as one month after origination).122 For the loans in this sample of 
foreclosure cases, the average interest rate in effect when the foreclosure case was 
initiated was 7.26%.123 In comparison, the average rate for a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage 
in 2006 was just 6.41%. Subprime borrowers are more likely to default on their loans, not 
only as a result of their economic characteristics, but also because of the features of the 
loans that they obtain.124 During the period when most of the loans in this study were 
originated, subprime lending was more prevalent among communities of color and 
                                                          
119 48.6% of the population of New York City had an annual household income of $49,999 or below while 
44.4% had an annual household income of $60,000 or above. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME, ACS 
2012 (5-YEAR ESTIMATES), Prepared using Social Explorer, 
https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/ACS2012_5yr/R11586847 (Author downloaded and filtered the 
data utilizing Social Explorer to analyze information limited to the five boroughs surround New York 
City).  
120 The median housing values at that time were as follows: Bronx, $380,900; Brooklyn, $562,600; 
Manhattan $827,300; Queens, $462,800; and Staten Island, $449,400. ACS 2012 (5-Year Estimates), 
SOCIAL EXPLORER, tbl. 100 (“House Value for All Owner-Occupied Housing Units”), 
https://www.socialexplorer.com/tables/ACS2012_5yr/R11586847 (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).  
121 IMMERGLUCK, supra note 74, at 84–98. 
122 Id. at 85. 
123 Because many of the loans had interest rates that were subject to adjustment, the original interest rate 
may have been different and, had the homeowner not defaulted, it might have changed over time.  
124 See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 74, at 136; Kristopher Gerardi et al., Subprime Outcomes: Risky 
Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures 1, 21–22 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working 
Paper No. 07-15, 2008).  
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among economically marginalized borrowers.125 Many of the loans in this study exhibit 
characteristics consistent with non-traditional lending and involve properties that are 
located in areas with higher Black populations. These findings suggest that economic and 
social inequality contributed to defendant homeowners’ entry into the foreclosure 
process. In the next section, I consider how inequalities shape the behavior of parties 
within the legal process.  
2. Differential Access to Legal Representation  
Exacerbating the disparity in resources between one-shotters and repeat players is 
their differential access to legal representation. As a result of their frequent participation 
in litigation, repeat players are likely to enjoy easy access to specialized legal counsel, 
while one-shotters face obstacles in obtaining legal representation, usually from less 
prestigious providers. In the case of RP v. OS disputes, one-shotters’ access to legal 
representation is further inhibited by their structural position as defendants. These 
dynamics are well illustrated by the foreclosure context.  
Corporations must be represented in civil actions in New York State,126 and all 
plaintiffs in the sample have representation. Although there are seventy-three different 
law firms that represented the plaintiffs,127 just three firms served as counsel in more than 
half of all cases: Steven J. Baum, P.C. represented the plaintiff in 29% of cases; Rosicki, 
Rosicki & Associates appeared in 14% of cases; and Fein, Such & Crane, LLP was 
plaintiff’s counsel in 10% of cases. These firms specialize in foreclosure cases and have 
largely automated, and in some cases even outsourced, the preparation of standardized 
pleadings.128 This high-volume “foreclosure mill” approach minimizes costs.129 These 
economies of scale benefit plaintiff lenders, who as repeat players, routinely handle 
similar cases by accessing specialized low-cost legal representation.130  
On the other hand, mass producing litigation disincentivizes more in-depth 
attention to each case. The Stephen J. Baum Firm and its affiliated business, Pillar 
Processing, LLC, were investigated by the New York State Attorney General and agreed 
to pay $4 million in penalties, costs, and fees before closing in 2011.131 The Attorney 
General found that the firm routinely filed foreclosures without verifying the accuracy of 
the plaintiffs’ claims, relied on non-attorney employees to prepare complaints, and had 
                                                          
125 IMMERGLUCK, supra note 74, at 78.  
126 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321(a) (MCKINNEY 1991). 
127 See infra App’x Table 23.  
128 Amir Efrati, Judges Tackle ‘Foreclosure Mills’: High-Volume Firms That Cut Corners Are Rebuked, 
Fined, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119639697577209194 (last updated Nov. 30, 2007, 
11:59 PM).  
129 Id.  
130 Id.; Gretchen Morgenson & Jonathan D. Glater, Foreclosure Machine Thrives on Woes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 30, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/business/30mills.html.  
131 Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $4 Million Settlement with 
New York Foreclosure Law Firm Steven J. Baum P.C. and Pillar Processing LLC (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-4-million-settlement-new-york-
foreclosure-law-firm-steven-j. The firm also attracted national attention through a series of articles in the 
New York Times, which included a column that incorporated photos from a Halloween party at the firm 
showing costumes and decorations mocking homeowners facing foreclosure. Joe Nocera, What the 
Costumes Reveal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/opinion/what-the-
costumes-reveal.html?_r=0. 
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employee attorneys pre-sign complaint verifications and other legal documents to be 
notarized later without the presence of the signing attorney. Despite this, there was no 
additional oversight required in cases where the firm had represented the plaintiff. Thus, 
in nearly one-third of the cases in this sample, the plaintiff was represented by a law firm 
known to have consistently engaged in unlawful practices, yet the legal pleadings were 
not subject to additional scrutiny.132    
In contrast to plaintiffs, who enjoy the benefits of high-efficiency (although 
questionably accurate) specialized legal representation, homeowner defendants face 
numerous obstacles with regard to access to counsel. In fact, most homeowners were 
unrepresented. Only 21% of homeowners had some form of legal representation, 
including representation limited to drafting an answer or appearing at a settlement 
conference. The number of homeowners who had traditional attorney-client relationships 
with lawyers was even lower. Although use of lawyers increased over time—only 7% of 
homeowners had representation among cases filed in 2007, compared with a high of 39% 
among cases filed in 2011—the majority of homeowners remained pro se even among the 
later cases.133 Among those homeowners who had legal representation, 60% were 
represented by solo practitioners.134 Lawyers who are part of law firms provided 
representation in 20% of cases with homeowner representation, while legal aid and pro 
bono programs represented homeowners in 15% of cases where the homeowner had 
representation. In another five cases, homeowners who had representation obtained 
counsel through a union prepaid legal assistance plan (3% of cases with legal 
representation for the homeowner).  
While only a few firms represented most of the plaintiffs, there was far less 
consolidation among lawyers representing the defendant homeowners. One hundred fifty-
eight solo practitioners or law firms provided representation in the 198 cases where the 
homeowners were represented. Only seventeen of these lawyers or law firms appeared in 
more than one case, and the legal provider who appeared most often appeared in only six 
cases.135 This lack of consolidation among foreclosure defense counsel may be 
consequential. Because the private foreclosure defense bar is so diffuse, comprised 
primarily of solo practitioners, it may limit defendants’ ability to identify and respond to 
patterns of behavior among plaintiffs. 
It is important to recognize that with these data, it is impossible to identify the 
reason why any individual homeowner did or did not obtain counsel.136 Unrepresented 
homeowners may not have wanted legal counsel or they may have been unsuccessful in 
                                                          
132 Perhaps law firms can be too big to fail; in this situation, pleadings prepared by an enterprise known to 
have engaged in fraud were allowed to stand, perhaps because it would be too disruptive to question them.  
Or, the court system may assume that lawyers taking over the cases reviewed the pleadings and responded 
appropriately.  
133 See infra Figure 3.  
134 See infra App’x Table 4 (identifying lawyers and law firms that appeared on behalf of defendant 
homeowners in at least two cases).  
135 Because each homeowner in the sample is unique but some plaintiffs appear in multiple cases, it is not 
surprising that the network between homeowners and their lawyers is less centralized than that of plaintiffs 
and their legal representatives. However, this disparity is also indicative of the structural context of 
foreclosure litigation. 
136 For additional discussion and analysis, see Emily S. Taylor Poppe, Homeowner Legal Representation in 
the Foreclosure Crisis, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 809 (2016).  
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attempts to hire lawyers. However, the differential usage of specialized legal counsel by 
lender plaintiffs and defendant homeowners are consistent with the structural inequalities 
predicted in RP v. OS litigation.  
3. Strategic Litigation 
A further advantage accruing to repeat players is their ability to engage in strategic 
litigation, which includes their ability to play the odds, focusing less attention on easier 
cases, and devoting greater resources to cases that involve rules. Over time, through 
repeat players’ focus on establishing precedent and their repeated presence in litigation, 
they shape what is defined as legal behavior. The foreclosure context helps to illustrate 
the results of that process.  
Lenders’ failure to assign notes, the use of fraudulent documents to recreate 
missing chains of title, and the discovery that records maintained by MERS were 
incomplete raised concerns during the Financial Crisis about plaintiffs’ standing to 
enforce the notes being foreclosed.137 Without investigating facts of each case not 
available in court records, it is impossible to verify the plaintiffs’ interests in the notes 
they were seeking to foreclose. However, the court records show the facts and 
documentary evidence provided by plaintiffs to the court in support of their complaints, 
and the records suggest the practices that were generally accepted by courts.  
While filing the note fulfills one of the requirements for establishing a prima facie 
case for foreclosure138 and offers important information about the plaintiffs’ interest and 
right to fees and costs, it was not required prior to 2013 in New York State. As Table 1 
indicates, plaintiffs provided a copy of the note as an exhibit to the complaint in only 
28% of cases.  
 
Table 1: Foreclosure Complaint Content 
  Yes No Unclear  
  (%) (%) (%) 
Note Attached as Exhibit  28 70 2 
Mortgage Recorded at Complaint Date  27 46 27 
Description of Chain of Title for Loan      
Origination Details Present 55 44 <1 
Intermediate Details Present 28 63 9 
Current Details Present  91 8 0 
Non-MERS Plaintiff  99 1 0 
Mortgage Never Held by MERS  67 33 0 
    
No Complaint Issues  10 86 4 
N = 938.     
 
It is also impossible to trace the chain of ownership in the notes from the 
information provided to the court in most cases. The plaintiff did not originate the 
                                                          
137 See supra Part II.A.1.  
138 Mark C. Dillon, Unsettled Times Make Well-Settled Law: Recent Developments in New York State’s 
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Statutes and Case Law, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1085, 1096 (2012–2013). 
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underlying loan in at least 76% of the cases.139 However, most complaints provided a 
limited description of the chain of assignments giving rise to the plaintiff’s interest in the 
note: 91% of cases described the most recent transaction, but only 55% of complaints 
described the origination of the loan, and only 28% provide information about any 
intervening transfers. In addition, at least 33% of the loans were assigned to MERS at 
some point, further obfuscating the chain of ownership.  
Recording a mortgage in the land records is another way of providing a record of 
interests in notes and in the underlying real property, although it is not required for a 
foreclosure claim. In only 27% of cases does the complaint indicate that the assignment 
transferring the mortgage to the plaintiff was recorded prior to the date of the complaint. 
In 46% of cases, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff has the right to enforce the note, 
but the mortgage “is to be assigned” or the assignment “is to be recorded.” In 27% of 
cases, it is not clear from the complaint when, or if, the mortgage assignment was 
recorded.  
New York civil procedural rules require that after filing the complaint, the plaintiff 
file a Request for Judicial Intervention. In response to high rates of homeowner default, 
the New York legislature established foreclosure settlement conferences in 2008.140 It is 
the filing of the Request for Judicial Intervention that triggers the court to schedule a 
settlement conference in eligible cases and gives the court jurisdiction over the matter.141 
Court administrators and legal aid attorneys found that after the adoption of the 
settlement conferences, there was a “Shadow Docket” of foreclosure cases in which 
complaints had been filed, but there was no Request for Judicial Intervention.142 The rise 
of this Shadow Docket meant that many homeowners were denied access to these 
conferences due to plaintiffs’ failures to prosecute foreclosure actions.143   
In this sample, there are twenty-four cases in which no Request for Judicial 
Intervention was ever filed. In many other cases, it was filed, but after a delay. The 
                                                          
139 The number may be even higher. If the complaint does not indicate whether the plaintiff originated the 
loan or subsequently acquired it, it is impossible to determine from the court records whether the loan has 
been assigned. The complaints also reveal the increased complexity of plaintiffs’ legal interests: 57% of 
cases identify a lender as the plaintiff; 37% name a trustee and the underlying security; 2% identify both a 
lender and a servicer; and nearly 4% name a trustee but not the security, or the servicer but neither a trustee 
nor a lender. 
140 The 2008 legislation required that the court schedule a mandatory settlement conference within sixty 
days of the filing of proof of service of the complaint in all residential foreclosure cases involving a 
“subprime” or “high-cost” loan originated between 2003 and 2008 where the defendant was a resident of 
the property. This legislation also permitted defendant homeowners in similar ongoing cases to request a 
settlement conference. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a)–(b) (MCKINNEY 2008). This program was expanded to 
require mandatory settlement conferences in all new residential foreclosure cases where the defendant 
occupied the property, regardless of loan type, as of February 13, 2010, and permitted defendant 
homeowners in similar ongoing cases to request settlement conferences. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) 
(MCKINNEY 2010).  
141 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (MCKINNEY 2017). 
142 MFY LEGAL SERVS., INC., JUSTICE DECEIVED: HOW LARGE FORECLOSURE FIRMS SUBVERT STATE 
REGULATIONS PROTECTING HOMEOWNERS 14–16 (2011), http://mobilizationforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/MFY-White-Paper-JUSTICE-DECEIVED.pdf. 
143 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT ON NEW YORK’S FORECLOSURE PROCESS 7 (2015), 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/banking/fore_proc_report_052015.pdf (describing the timing and 
sources of delays in the foreclosure process).  
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median time between the date on which the complaint was signed and the filing of the 
Request for Judicial Intervention was a little over three months. Because of the time 
required for notice, one would expect a period of time to elapse. However, 10% of cases 
involved a period of more than a year between the verification of the complaint and the 
filing of the Request for Judicial Intervention. The longest delays lasted for years, with up 
to four and one-half years passing between the complaint date and the filing of the 
Request for Judicial Intervention.  
All of this is in contrast to the formalized image of the foreclosure process that one 
might expect.144 After all, the process is driven by highly sophisticated financial 
institutions. It also relates to transfers in land, which are notorious for their embrace of 
formalism. Moreover, the process imposes severe consequences including eviction and 
the forced sale of a home. The next section considers how homeowner defendants 
respond to the pleadings put forth by the plaintiff lenders.  
4. Homeowner Action 
The central phenomenon of interest in this Article is the limited legal action taken 
by consumer defendants. Homeowner defendants facing foreclosure fit many of the 
patterns observed in other forms of defensive consumer litigation, and RP v. OS litigation 
more broadly. The formal means of challenging a plaintiff’s right to foreclose is through 
an answer,145 which is essential for raising defenses and avoiding default, and may 
facilitate opportunities for negotiation or discretion. However, homeowners filed an 
answer in only 24% of cases.  
As Figure 3 illustrates, the rate of homeowner participation increased over time. 
Given the small number of cases filed in 2012 and 2013 (because this sample focused on 
lis pendens filed between 2007 and 2011), the apparent decline in rates of participation 
among cases filed in those years should be interpreted with some caution. Regardless, it 
is important to note that most homeowners did not file an answer, even in 2011, when 
homeowner participation reached its peak.  
It is also important to note the types of answers filed by homeowners. Although 
lawyers drafted 44% of the answers filed by homeowners, 27% were check-the-box 
forms, and homeowners without legal assistance wrote 29% of the answers. As Figure 3 
indicates, much of the increase in the proportion of cases involving an answer was the 
result of increased use of check-the-box answer forms. If homeowners are able to file 
these answers but unable to defeat a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, they may 
not influence the outcome of the case. On the other hand, having raised defenses to the 
action may provide homeowners an advantage in negotiating an alternative to 
foreclosure, even if they are not able to prove the defenses raised. This highlights the 
importance of understanding not only the quantity, but also the quality of defendant 
participation in civil actions, and suggests an important area for future research.  
 
                                                          
144 Zacks & Zacks, supra note 89, at 711.  
145 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3018 (MCKINNEY 1980); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215 (MCKINNEY 2007). 




Figure 3: Proportion of Cases with Homeowner Answer, by Answer Type and 




Within the answers filed by defendant homeowners, lack of standing was the most 
common defense raised, with half of all answers (50.3%) including this defense (about 
12% of all homeowners in the sample). In most answers, homeowners raise multiple 
defenses or counterclaims. Homeowners allege that the plaintiff failed to provide proper 
notice to the homeowner in 46% of answers. In 28% of answers, the homeowner claims 
to be entitled to, or in the process of being considered for, a loan modification under the 
HAMP program. Twenty-six percent of answers raised allegations regarding predatory 
lending, and 20% claimed that the plaintiff failed to credit payments received. In 
addition, 16% of answers sought equitable relief on the basis of bad faith on the part of 
the plaintiff in a variety of circumstances. Nearly half of all answers also included 
additional defenses or claims not described here that may or may not have been legally 
valid defenses.       
These results show that there was limited legal action taken by defendant 
homeowners. This raises a question as to whether homeowners’ action (or inaction) is the 
result of strategic behavior or whether homeowners fail to realize the applicability of 
potential defenses. With these observational data, it is impossible to determine this for 
any individual case. However, it is useful to explore whether homeowners are more likely 
to file answers when the complaint fails to offer documentary evidence supporting its 
claim or references situations that may indicate lapses in the chain of assignment giving 
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To assess this possibility, I estimated a series of logistic regression models using 
the presence of these issues to predict the probability of a homeowner answer.146 These 
statistical models estimate the probability that a homeowner filed an answer (relative to 
the probability that they did not), taking into account the presence of these potential 
issues. A strong association between indicators of the potential availability of a legal 
defense and the probability of a homeowner filing an answer would suggest that 
homeowners were responding to these issues in deciding to file an answer. This would be 
consistent with the idea of homeowners policing foreclosure formalities. Because 
homeowners’ decisions to file an answer might be influenced by other factors, I also 
adjusted for additional case characteristics: the county where the case was filed; 
eligibility for settlement conferences during the period when the case was filed; the 
plaintiffs’ legal representative; the characteristics of the loan; and the characteristics of 
the area where the property was located.147   
I found that the settlement conference eligibility requirements in effect at the time a 
case was filed were associated with the presence of an answer, and there was variation 
across counties in levels of representation.148 However, I find virtually no statistically 
significant relationship between the contents of the complaint and the probability that the 
homeowner filed an answer.149 This offers little evidence that the minority of 
homeowners who engaged in the foreclosure process were strategically responding to 
observable actions by the plaintiff.  
5. Win, Lose, or Draw 
Of the 938 cases in this sample, 16% (n=153) were still ongoing at the end of data 
collection, 20% (n=189) ended in foreclosure, and 64% (n=596) were discontinued or 
dismissed, nearly all without prejudice.150 The high rate of discontinuance is consistent 
with other research,151 and reflects a number of different factual scenarios. Table 6 
describes the reasons for which cases were discontinued. Just over 7% of cases (n=70) 
were discontinued because the loan was reinstated or satisfied, or another settlement was 
reached. Another 17% (n=162) of cases involved loan modifications, short sales, 
forbearance, or bankruptcy. Just under 10% of cases (n=93) were dismissed due to 
improper action on the part of the plaintiff, including 6% of cases (n=60) being dismissed 
for failure to prosecute and 1% of cases (n=9) in which the plaintiff lacked standing.  
As Table 6 demonstrates, the remaining discontinued cases—which account for 
                                                          
146 Estimated coefficients reported infra App’x Table 5.  
147 The analytic sample excludes two cases where it was not clear whether MERS had ever held the 
mortgage, and I present the results for all cases: those in which the homeowner had legal representation and 
those in which the homeowner was pro se. 
148 Individual bivariate analyses yield similar findings. 
149 The results do indicate that among cases where the homeowner had legal representation, the homeowner 
is more likely to have filed an answer if the mortgage was held by MERS at some point.  
150 Dismissals are rare relative to discontinuances, however, and since both are without prejudice, there is 
little substantive difference between them.  
151 See MFY LEGAL SERVS., INC., JUSTICE UNSETTLED: HOW THE FORECLOSURE SHADOW DOCKET & 
DISCONTINUANCES PREVENT NEW YORKERS FROM SAVING THEIR HOMES 2 (2012), 
http://mobilizationforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/Justice-Unsettled-plus-APP.pdf; Sewin Chan et al., 
Pathways After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their Homes? 48 J. REAL 
ESTATE & FINAN. ECON. 342, 351 (2014).  
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nearly 30% of the entire sample (n=281)—were discontinued without reason. In these 
cases, the affidavit filed by the plaintiff in support of the Stipulation of Discontinuance 
typically states that the “plaintiff elected not to move forward with the case,” without 
further detail. The court records and dockets in these cases include no references to loan 
modifications, loan reinstatements, or other negotiated alternatives to foreclosure, 
suggesting that they were discontinued for other reasons. The explanation commonly held 
by practitioners was that plaintiffs were unable to move forward with these foreclosure 
actions because of flaws in the underlying documentation.  
If the plaintiff is able to correct these flaws, the cases can be re-filed, resulting in a 
delay that may be beneficial to homeowners or may make it more difficult for them to 
avoid foreclosure.152 Even if the cases are not re-filed, they can result in “zombie” 
debt.153  Either case involves a period of uncertainty that can have negative implications 
for homeowners, lenders, and the housing market more generally. It is entirely within the 
control of lenders to resolve these situations, making them an example of their ability to 
























                                                          
152 MFY LEGAL SERVS., supra note 151, at 2. (“In our experience, when a foreclosure action is filed but 
later discontinued without settlement, a homeowner has more difficulty negotiating a loan modification 
than he would had he not been sued in the first instance.”). Although there has been economic analysis of 
the costs and benefits of delaying foreclosure, see CHARLES CALOMIRIS & ERIC HIGGINS, POLICY BRIEFING: 
ARE DELAYS TO THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS A GOOD THING? (2011), there is less evidence on the effects 
of delay—including non-economic costs—for consumers.  
153 Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 327 (2014) 
(noting that “by obtaining judgments, or persuading consumers to pay a portion” of debts that are 
unenforceable or that have already been satisfied, debt collectors effectively resurrect the debts).  
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Table 6: Distribution of Foreclosure Case Outcomes 
 
 
D. Significance of the Results 
In an opinion dismissing a series of foreclosure cases brought in the Northern 
District of Ohio during this time period, Judge Christopher Boyko described the 
foreclosure process as a “quasi-monopolistic system [that] financial institutions have 
traditionally controlled, and still control.”154 The results of this empirical study are 
consistent with this characterization. In an era of widespread robo-signing and missing 
notes, lenders used high-volume, low-cost specialized law firms to mass produce 
complaints that lacked documentary evidence of the underlying loan. Regardless of these 
factors, and in spite of the potential for loan modifications and other outcomes more 
favorable than foreclosure, only a fraction of homeowner defendants participated in the 
process. Even fewer had legal representation, and those who did relied primarily on solo 
practitioners. Nevertheless, as Table 6 demonstrated, a large proportion of cases were 
discontinued—pushing final resolution to another day, and raising questions about the 
validity of the uncontested plaintiffs’ claims. 
This empirical study illustrates the low rate of legal activity among consumer 
                                                          
154 In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 1:07-CV-2282, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007). 
N %
Discontinued or Dismissed
Loan Reinstated 27 2.88
Loan Satisfied 24 2.57
Loan Reinstated or Satisfied 1 0.12
Settled 18 1.91
Loan modification 124 13.20
Short sale 34 3.66
Forebearance 3 0.28
Bankruptcy 1 0.06
Dismissed for Failure to Prosecute 60 6.39
Lack of Standing 9 1.01
Improper Notice 8 0.90
Plaintiff Default 2 0.19
Prior Action Ongoing 1 0.16
Lack of Signature 1 0.16
Service Members Civil Relief Act 1 0.12
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defendants in a context where one might anticipate greater participation. The frequency 
and type of legal representation obtained by the plaintiffs and defendants is consistent 
with the structural inequalities inherent in RP v. OS litigation. However, the high rate of 
discontinuances is a marked difference from the high rate of default judgments observed 
in other types of debt collection actions. On the other hand, this may reflect strategic 
decisions on the part of plaintiffs whose pleadings were insufficient as originally filed or 
who had a financial interest in delaying the foreclosure. These findings highlight the 
potential role of consumer defendants as monitors of civil procedures and enforcers of 
substantive consumer laws, while illustrating the obstacles that limit their participation in 
civil litigation.  
While the salience of foreclosures as a socio-legal problem has diminished since 
the Financial Crisis, many of the observed phenomena remain relevant. The secondary 
mortgage market remains active, and mortgage securitization continues, requiring 
frequent assignments of interests in loans and mortgages.155 The incentive among lenders 
to minimizing costs in the foreclosure process is unchanged.156 Moreover, both the 
limited incentives for homeowners to challenge potential defects in foreclosure and the 
difficulties faced in doing so still remain.157 Indeed, as attention to foreclosures wanes, 
public awareness of these issues declines, and while the stigma of foreclosure 
increases,158 support for policy interventions diminishes.159 
III. ENHANCING CONSUMER DEFENDING 
As this Article argues, and the empirical study illustrates, inadequate incentives and 
structural inequalities may contribute to diminished levels of legal action among 
consumer defendants. While these dynamics are well illustrated by foreclosures, they are 
not limited to the mortgage enforcement context; rather, these patterns are typical of 
defensive consumer litigation and RP v. OS disputes more broadly.160 The low rate of 
legal activity among consumer defendants is concerning not only because it can result in 
unresolved harm to consumers, but also because we rely on consumer defendants to 
                                                          
155 Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do 
About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 740 (2010).  
156 Matthew Goldstein et al., How Housing’s New Players Spiraled into Banks’ Old Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/27/business/dealbook/private-equity-housing-
missteps.html. 
157 See, e.g., Harold L. Levine, A Day in the Life of a Residential Mortgage Defendant, 36 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 687, 694–95, 698–99 (2003) (describing the challenges facing foreclosure defendants prior to the 
foreclosure crisis).  
158 See McCormack, supra note 98, at 278.  
159 For example, the New York state procedural reforms are set to sunset in 2020, N.Y. C.P.L.R.  
3408(a) (MCKINNEY 2017), and the state used proceeds from the national mortgage settlement to cover the 
costs of housing counseling and legal-aid programs, Shaila Dewan, Needy States Use Housing Aid Cash to 
Plug Budgets, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/business/states-diverting-
mortgage-settlement-money-to-other-uses.html. See also PHILLIP SWAGEL, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN 
INSIDE VIEW 62 (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/2009a_bpea_swagel.pdf 
(noting the importance of maintaining public support for interventions designed to address the Financial 
Crisis in the context of the financial system).  
160 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 18, at 372, 377–79, 387 (documenting similar patterns in debt-collection cases 
in Indiana); Cowley & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 3 (noting similarities between subprime-mortgage 
foreclosures and student-loan collections). 
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monitor and enforce procedural rules and substantive consumer laws. This section 
describes the following three approaches to addressing the challenge of limited legal 
activity among consumer defendants: procedures to increase legal participation by 
consumer defendants; mechanisms to enhance the availability and effectiveness of legal 
counsel for consumer defendants; and burden-shifting to mediate the impact of consumer 
defendants’ inactivity.  
A. Procedural Reforms 
High rates of default pose a considerable challenge to the enforcement of 
procedural rules and substantive consumer protections by consumer defendants. 
Procedural reforms that encourage legal action among consumer defendants offer one 
approach to addressing this issue. Here, the New York State foreclosure context provides 
a helpful example. As noted above, the state adopted a program of court-mandated 
settlement conferences in foreclosure cases to address the high rate of default among 
defendant homeowners. After the adoption of the program, there was a substantial decline 
in rates of default among homeowners.161 In addition, the settlement conferences were 
associated with an increase in the probability that a homeowner filed an answer and with 
a decrease in the probability that a case ended in foreclosure.162 Research on unsecured 
debt collection cases also finds a link between civil procedural design and debtor 
participation.163 There is more work to be done to understand the mechanisms that 
underlie these results, but they are consistent with the idea that court processes can 
increase legal action on the part of consumer defendants.  
However, enhanced participation by consumer defendants may not be uniformly 
favorable. Where a consumer defendant has no cognizable defense, a default judgment is 
an efficient resolution; if participation is costly, it could actually leave the consumer 
defendant worse off. On the other hand, a calculus that takes into account only the 
availability of legal defenses may not accurately capture the benefits of avoiding default, 
for the consumer defendant or more broadly. By appearing in court, consumer defendants 
may have an opportunity to mediate the ultimate outcome through negotiation with the 
plaintiff or as a result of the court’s discretion. Participation may also offer less tangible 
benefits, such as increasing the defendants’ perception of procedural justice. In addition, 
by bringing facts to the court’s attention, the consumer defendant may raise awareness of 
unethical or abusive behavior. These benefits can offset the costs of participation for the 
consumer defendant as well as the additional court burden imposed by increased legal 
action.  
B. Access to Specialized Counsel  
A second approach to expanding consumer defendants’ legal activity is to enhance 
their access to legal counsel. As the foreclosure study highlights, consumer defendants’ 
structural position means that they are doubly disadvantaged with regard to legal 
                                                          
161 This finding in the empirical study is confirmed by aggregate state data. See PFAU, supra note 110, at 4 
(“Following the 2009 and 2010 legislation and the court system’s extensive public outreach efforts, the 
default rate dropped significantly.”). 
162 See Taylor Poppe, supra note 136, at 822–23 (finding that the probability of foreclosure is lower among 
cases initiated after the implementation of foreclosure-settlement conferences). 
163 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 19, at 204.  
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representation. While their litigation opponents enjoy the economies of scale generated 
by the high-volume, low-cost production of standardized complaints, consumer 
defendants require more customized and costly representation. Unlike consumer 
plaintiffs, consumer defendants are not able to obtain legal representation through class 
actions and contingency-fee arrangements. And, because consumer defendants’ cases are 
not aggregated and they rely disproportionately on solo practitioners, there is a lack of 
coordinated legal work aimed at addressing systemic issues affecting consumer 
defendants.  
On top of these structural inequalities restricting their access to counsel, consumer 
defendants often have limited incentive to bring legal defenses. A homeowner facing 
foreclosure, for example, may not have received proper service, or the complaint may not 
include all information necessary to establish a prima facie case for foreclosure, or the 
plaintiff may not arrive at a settlement conference with the requisite knowledge about the 
case. However, the homeowner defendant has limited incentive to pursue defenses 
generated by these failures if they are unlikely to alter the ultimate disposition of the case. 
As a result, there is less effective monitoring and enforcement of the debt collection 
process.  
One way to address these structural inequalities and enhance the incentive for 
raising defenses is fee-shifting.164 If plaintiffs were liable for the costs defendants incur in 
raising affirmative substantive defenses, it would modify the incentive structure that 
discourages such action by consumer defendants. In addition, it would offer an incentive 
for lawyers to take on greater representation of consumers in defensive consumer 
litigation. This, in turn, could help to establish a more organized consumer defense bar.  
A second approach is to increase the availability of legal aid for consumer 
defendants. As it stands, legal aid and consumer advocate organizations are responsible 
for identifying many of the issues affecting consumer defendants. In the New York 
foreclosure context, for example, it was legal aid organizations that identified many 
plaintiffs’ practice of not filing a Request for Judicial Intervention and the resulting 
Shadow Docket. The organizations were also responsible for highlighting plaintiffs’ role 
in delays in the foreclosure process and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory 
provisions that their representatives possessed knowledge and authority to settle at 
conferences.165 Not surprisingly given their expertise, representation by a legal aid 
organization is also associated with more favorable outcomes than representation by a 
for-profit legal aid provider.166   
Familiarity with the issues facing a group of similar defendants can lead not only to 
                                                          
164 Froehle, supra note 102, at 1741–42.  
165 LEGAL SERVS. FOR THE ELDERLY IN QUEENS ET AL., STALLED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES: BANKS 
FRUSTRATE NEW YORK’S FORECLOSURE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 4 (2014), 
http://mobilizationforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/Stalled-Settlement-Conferences.pdf (hereinafter 
STALLED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES) (finding that 36% of lenders’ representatives appeared at 
foreclosure-settlement conferences without required information and 44% appeared without authority to 
settle, as required by statute). 
166 In other analyses based on the foreclosure-cases dataset used in this Article, I find that representation by 
a legal-aid lawyer was associated with a greater probability of avoiding foreclosure than representation by a 
private attorney. Taylor Poppe, supra note 136, at 826. 
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effective representation, but legal change.167 However, the scope of legal aid for 
consumer defendants is a function of available resources. During the Financial Crisis, 
additional funds were temporarily allotted to organizations that assisted homeowners. But 
the general trend in funding for legal aid is negative, and efforts to expand access to civil 
justice often focus on plaintiffs. Moreover, traditional financial eligibility requirements 
may limit consumer defendants’ access to legal aid, while they remain unable to afford 
legal counsel given their precarious financial position. Thus, there is room to enhance 
access to legal counsel on behalf of consumer defendants.  
C. Burden-Shifting 
Finally, an alternate approach is to mediate the impact of consumer defendants’ 
limited legal action through burden-shifting.168 Scholars have documented the legal 
insufficiency and inaccuracy of claims brought against consumers in unsecured debt 
collection cases, foreclosure actions, and bankruptcy. However, the consumer defendant 
typically carries the burden of contesting the claim.169 Increased pleading and evidentiary 
standards can help to shift this burden away from the consumer. Given the typical 
information asymmetry between the consumer defendant and the plaintiff, this places the 
burden on the party best equipped to provide detail on the underlying obligation.  
The New York State foreclosure process again offers an example of this type of 
reform. The state began requiring plaintiffs in foreclosure actions to provide to the court a 
copy of the note and all related documents establishing the plaintiff’s interest in the note. 
Adopted in response to the robo-signing scandal, this increased the evidence required to 
establish the plaintiff’s prima facie case for foreclosure.170 In addition, foreclosure 
prosecution lawyers were required to sign a certificate of merit attesting to their review of 
the underlying documents, providing incentive beyond ethical obligations to ensure the 
veracity of complaints.171  After the adoption of this affirmation requirement, foreclosure 
filings dropped precipitously, from 3,500 new foreclosure filings each month to only 
775.172 This drop in foreclosure filings after the adoption of these reforms suggests that 
they had an impact on plaintiffs’ behavior.173 Had the complaints filed by plaintiffs 
                                                          
167 Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 445, 
461–62 (2015). 
168 Ensuring that legal burdens are imposed on the party best able to bear them is a common concern of 
regulatory design, such as in the employment-discrimination context, see e.g., Sandra Sperino, Rethinking 
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 74–75 (2011) (discussing Congressional intervention in the 
development of anti-discrimination evidentiary burden-shifting practices), and the environmental-law 
context, see, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 327–29 (8th ed. 2018). 
169 See supra Part II. 
170 Admin. Order 548-10 (Oct. 20, 2010). This order was modified nunc pro tunc on March 2, 2011 by 
Admin. Order 431-11. 
171 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-b(a) (MCKINNEY 2013). 
172 PFAU, supra note 110, at 2. Although foreclosure moratoria adopted by some banks also impacted 
foreclosure rates during this period, the timing is consistent with impact of the law. In addition, litigation 
challenging the validity of this order shows that lenders viewed it as imposing additional burdens. George 
Bundy Smith & Thomas J. Hall, Limitations on Chief Administrative Judge’s Rule-Making Authority, 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/chadbourne/publications/smith_hall%20nylj_april2011.pdf.  
173 See PFAU, supra note 110, at 2 (describing the dramatic decline in foreclosure filings after the 
imposition of the affirmation requirement).  
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already met these standards, or had plaintiffs easily been able to meet these requirements, 
one would not have expected such a dramatic decline in filings.  
Thus, burden-shifting can be used to mediate the impact of consumer defendants’ 
failure to respond to plaintiffs’ claims. To the extent that consumer defendants’ inactivity 
results in uncontested violations of procedural, evidentiary, or substantive law, burden-
shifting offers an alternate form of enforcement. However, the potential of this approach 
should not be overstated, given the limits of formal law to protect consumers.174  
Moreover, burden-shifting requirements can have unanticipated consequences. For 
example, increased formalism that benefits consumer defendants may have negative 
repercussions for consumer plaintiffs,175 and higher debt enforcement costs reduce access 
to credit.176  Thus, the costs and benefits of this approach must be carefully balanced.  
While pro-defendant civil procedures, expanded access to legal counsel, and 
burden-shifting reforms can help to address consumer defendants’ lack of legal activity, 
they are not the only solutions. In many cases, regulatory action and the expansion of 
consumer protections through substantive legal reform offer more direct responses.177 
However, in eras of diminished consumer protections and regulatory action, enabling 
consumer defensive litigation may be one of the more feasible options available.  
CONCLUSION 
As the quote at the outset of this Article warns, imagining what should happen is of 
less value than understanding what does. This is particularly true in the context of 
defensive consumer litigation. Exemplified by debt collection cases, this form of 
litigation involves the filing of legal claims arising out of consumer transactions against 
individual defendants whose response is generally to lump it. While under-enforcement 
by consumer plaintiffs is well recognized as a challenge to consumer law, the inaction of 
consumer defendants has received less attention. This Article further develops existing 
scholarship by describing how defensive consumer litigation differs from that in which 
consumers are the plaintiff. Using the empirical study of the residential foreclosure 
                                                          
174 See, e.g., STALLED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES, supra note 165, at 4–5 (reporting high rates of non-
compliance among lenders in foreclosure-settlement conferences); Porter, supra note 91, at 124 (noting that 
“Far from serving as a significant check against mistake or misbehavior, the bankruptcy system routinely 
processes mortgage claims that cannot be validated and are not, in fact, lawful.”).  
175 Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, 402 
(2013). 
176 Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: 
Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 221, 231 (1990); Karen 
M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177, 
180, 182 (2006) (finding that comparable loans are smaller in judicial-foreclosure states and concluding 
that the judicial-foreclosure process imposes higher costs on borrowers). 
177 For example, improprieties in the foreclosure process resulting from poor record-keeping within the 
mortgage industry that give rise to affirmative defenses for homeowners could also be addressed by 
reforming the process through which transfers of mortgage interests are effected and recorded. James M. 
Davis, Paper Weight: Problems in the Documentation and Enforcement of Transferred Mortgage Loans, 
and a Proposal for an Electronic Solution, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 366 (2013) (proposing an electronic 
registry for transferable notes); Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title 
Recording System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 24 (2011) (proposing a federal land-title system); 
Dale A. Whitman, A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done Right, 78 MO. L. REV. 1, 46 
(2013) (proposing a national alternative to MERS). 
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process in New York City as an illustrative example, this Article highlights how incentive 
structures and structural inequalities contribute to low rates of legal action among 
consumer defendants. This inactivity not only has implications for individual consumers, 
but restricts their ability to monitor and enforce procedural and substantive law. For this 
reason, additional attention to consumer defendants’ propensity to lump it is warranted. 
Regulatory action and the expansion of consumer protections through substantive legal 
reform could all help to address these issues, as might procedural reforms, interventions 
to expand access to counsel, and burden-shifting.    
  




Appendix Table 1. Distribution of Foreclosure Cases by County and Year 
of Filing 
  N % 
County   
Bronx  123 0.13 
Brooklyn 351 0.37 
Manhattan 37 0.04 
Queens 326 0.35 
Staten Island  102 0.11 
   
Year of Case Filing   
2007 111 0.12 
2008 190 0.20 
2009 268 0.29 
2010 198 0.21 
2011 72 0.08 
2012 72 0.08 
2013 27 0.03 
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Appendix Table 2. Plaintiffs 
  N % 
Wells Fargo 134 14.26 
US Bank 127 13.59 
Deutsche Bank 113 12.01 
JP Morgan Chase 84 8.96 
HSBC  71 7.54 
Bank of America 53 5.65 
Citibank 52 5.53 
Bank of New York Trust Company 33 3.53 
Onewest Bank 22 2.37 
LaSalle Bank  22 2.31 
Aurora 19 2.02 
IndyMac Bank 15 1.58 
GMAC Mortgage 10 1.05 
Countrywide 10 1.02 
Washington Mutual 9 1.01 
Flagstar Bank 8 0.82 
Emigrant Mortgage Company  7 0.77 
Freemont Investment and Loan 7 0.70 
Wachovia  6 0.65 
Nationstar Mortgage 6 0.59 
Meritt Funding  5 0.59 
   
Other (86 other plaintiffs named)  126 13.47 
Total  938 100.00 
   
Note: Each of the plaintiffs listed appeared in at least five cases. Subsidiaries 
and parent companies are joined, and there is no distinction made between 
lenders, servicers, and trustees. Plaintiffs are identified as described in the 





NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY                 [2019      
 188 
Appendix Table 3. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers 
  N % 
Steven J. Baum P.C.  269 28.70 
Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates  131 13.99 
Fein, Such & Crane, LLP 92 9.86 
Shapiro & DiCaro [and Barak]*, LLP 60 6.40 
Frenkel, Lambert, Weiss, Weisman  54 5.78 
McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C.  40 4.26 
Druckman Law Group 25 2.63 
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson [& Peddy] 25 2.63 
Stein, Wiener & Roth, LLP 21 2.23 
Sweeney, Gallo, Reich & Bolz  19 2.00 
Jordan S. Katz, Esq.  17 1.82 
Gross, Polowy & Orlans 15 1.65 
Knuckles & Komosinski [& Elliott], P.C.  15 1.64 
Davidson Fink [Cook, Kelly], LLP 15 1.59 
Stiene & Associates, P.C.  13 1.44 
Leopold & Associates, PLLC  12 1.32 
Alan H. Weinreb  11 1.21 
Sheldon, May & Associates, P.C.  10 1.03 
Zavatsky Mendelsohn & Levy  7 0.73 
Doonan & Graves [Longoria], Esqs. 6 0.68 
   
Other (53 firms)  79 8.41 
   
Total  938 100.00 
*Barak was added to the firm’s name during the observation period.  
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Appendix Table 4. Homeowners’ Lawyers 
  N % 
Todd P. Arbesfeld, Esq.  6 3.04 
DC 37 Municipal Employees Legal Services  5 2.53 
Cabanillas & Associates, P.C.  5 2.37 
Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A  4 2.20 
The Legal Aid Society  4 1.86 
Rubin & Licatesi, P.C.  3 1.31 
Staten Island Legal Services 2 1.16 
MFY Legal Services, Inc.  2 1.16 
Urban Justice Center 2 1.15 
Queens Legal Services 2 1.15 
Queens Volunteer Lawyers Project, Inc.  2 1.15 
Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP 2 1.09 
Alice A. Nicholson, Esq.  2 1.09 
Warren Sussman, Esq.  2 0.93 
Boris H. Linares, Esq.  2 0.93 
Jose A. Polcano, Esq.  2 0.93 
PLC Law Group, LLP 2 0.93 
Craig A. Fine, Esq.  2 0.87 
   
Other (139 lawyers or firms)  145 74.14 
   
Total  198 100.00 
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Appendix Table 5. Estimated Coefficients from Logistic Regression 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4 Model 6
Note Attached as Exhibit 0.07 -0.03 -0.42 -0.92 -0.15 -0.04 
(0.27) (0.37) (0.40) (0.71) (0.19) (0.24)
MERS Has Held Mortgage 0.17 0.03 0.56  1.26* 0.31 0.32
(0.28) (0.30) (0.37) (0.53) (0.19) (0.21)
Mortgage Recorded 
Yes 0.08 0.03 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.06
(0.30) (0.33) (0.52) (0.59) (0.21) (0.24)
Unclear -0.01 -0.01 -0.40 -0.76 -0.08 -0.16 
(0.31) (0.38) (0.41) (0.57) (0.22) (0.26)
Mortgage History 
Origination History Present 0.01 -0.06 0.11 0.18 -0.03 -0.38 
(0.29) (0.34) (0.48) (0.64) (0.20) (0.26)
Intermediate History Present -0.27 -0.31 -0.26 -0.14 0.06 0.01
(0.31) (0.33) (0.45) (0.55) (0.20) (0.22)
Most Recent Ownership Present 0.30 0.22 -0.04 -0.84 0.31 0.05
(0.41) (0.46) (0.69) (0.97) (0.31) (0.35)
Bronx 0.13 -0.57 -0.03 
(0.41) (0.63) (0.29)
Brooklyn 0.10   -1.60** -0.25 
(0.36) (0.51) (0.24)
Manhattan 0.35 -0.69 -0.38 
(0.50) (1.08) (0.38)
Queens (ref .) --- --- ---
Staten_Island 0.37 -1.37 -0.24 
(0.40) (0.71) (0.30)
Settlement Conference Period 
Pre-reform, No Conferences (ref. ) --- --- ---
Varied Conference Eligibility  0.29    2.72**  1.03*
(0.47) (0.96) (0.42)
Mandatory Conferences   1.32**      3.68***      2.15***
(0.51) (0.99) (0.44)
Additional Variables 
Loan Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Property Block Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant -2.26 -6.15 0.73 -12.81 -1.51 -6.70 
LRX
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